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THE REAL MONROE DOCTRINE

BY THE HONORABLE ELIHU ROOT, UNITED STATES SENATOR

WE are all familiar with President Monroe's famous message of December 2, 1823:

The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers. . . .

In the wars of the European Powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.

We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. . . .

It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference.

The occasion for these declarations is a familiar story: The revolt of the Spanish provinces in America which Spain, unaided, was plainly unable to reduce to their former condition of dependence; the reaction against liberalism in Europe which followed the downfall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne of France; the formation of the Holy Alliance; the Agreement of its members at the Conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle and Laybach and Verona for the insurance of Monarchy against revolution; the restoration of Ferdinand the Seventh to the throne of Spain by the armed power of France pursuant to this agreement; the purpose of the Alliance to follow the restoration of monarchy in Spain by the restoration of that monarchy's control over its colonies in the New World; the claims both of Russia and of Great Britain to rights of colonization on the Northwest coast; the proposals of Mr. Canning to Richard Rush for a joint declaration of principles by England and the United States adverse to the interference of any other European Power in the contest between Spain and her former colonies; the serious question raised by this proposal as to the effect of a joint declaration upon the American policy of avoiding entangling alliances.

The form and phrasing of President Monroe's message were adapted to meet these conditions. The statements made were intended to carry specific information to the members of the Holy Alliance that an attempt by any of them to coerce the new states of South America would be not a simple expedition against weak and disunited colonies, but the much more difficult and expensive task of dealing with the formidable maritime power of the United States as well as the opposition of England, and they were intended to carry to Russia and incidentally to England the idea that rights to territory in the New World must thenceforth rest upon then existing titles, and that the United States would dispute any attempt to create rights to territory by future occupation.

It is undoubtedly true that the specific occasions for the declaration of Monroe no longer exist. The Holy Alliance long ago disappeared. The nations of Europe no longer contemplate the vindication of monarchical principles in the territory of the New World. France, the most active of the Allies, is herself a republic. No nation longer asserts the right of colonization in America. The general establish-

ment of diplomatic relations between the Powers of Europe and the American republics, if not already universal, became so when, pursuant to the formal assent of the Powers, all the American republics were received into the Second Conference at The Hague and joined in the conventions there made, upon the footing of equal sovereignty, entitled to have their territory and independence respected under that law of nations which formerly existed for Europe alone.

The declaration, however, did more than deal with the specific occasion which called it forth. It was intended to declare a general principle for the future, and this is plain not merely from the generality of the terms used, but from the discussions out of which they arose and from the understanding of the men who took part in the making and of their successors.

When Jefferson was consulted by President Monroe before the message was sent he replied:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs.

Three years later Daniel Webster declared that the Doctrine involved the honor of the country. He said in the House of Representatives:

I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation; and, for one, I intend to guard it. . . . I will neither help to erase it nor tear it out; nor shall it be, by any act of mine, blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and will not diminish that honor.

Mr. Cleveland said in his Message of December 17, 1895:

The doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures.

As the particular occasions which called it forth have slipped back into history, the Declaration itself, instead of

being handed over to the historian, has grown continually a more vital and insistent rule of conduct for each succeeding generation of Americans. Never for a moment have the responsible and instructed statesmen in charge of the foreign affairs of the United States failed to consider themselves bound to insist upon its policy. Never once has the public opinion of the people of the United States failed to support every just application of it as new occasion has arisen. Almost every President and Secretary of State has restated the Doctrine with vigor and emphasis in the discussion of the diplomatic affairs of his day. The Governments of Europe have gradually come to realize that the existence of the policy which Monroe declared is a stubborn and continuing fact to be recognized in their controversies with American countries. We have seen Spain, France, England, Germany, with admirable good sense and good temper, explaining beforehand to the United States that they intended no permanent occupation of territory, in the controversy with Mexico forty years after the Declaration, and in the controversy with Venezuela eighty years after. In 1903 the Duke of Devonshire declared "Great Britain accepts the Monroe Doctrine unreservedly." Mr. Hay coupled the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule as cardinal guides of American diplomacy. Twice within very recent years the whole treaty-making power of the United States has given its formal approval to the policy by the reservations in the signature and in the ratification of the Arbitration Conventions of The Hague Conferences, expressed in these words by the Senate resolution agreeing to ratification of the Convention of 1907:

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state, nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions.

It seems fair to assume that a policy with such a history as this has some continuing and substantial reason underlying it; that it is not outworn or meaningless or a purely formal relic of the past, and it seems worth while to consider carefully what the Doctrine is and what it is not.

No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a

rule of international law or that the Doctrine which he declared has become international law. It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States, and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. The Declaration does not say what the course of the United States will be in case such acts are done. That is left to be determined in each particular instance. Mr. Calhoun said, in the Senate debate on the Yucatan Bill, in 1848:

Whether you will resist or not and the measure of your resistance—whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure or by a resort to arms; all this must be determined and decided on the merits of the question itself. This is the only wise course. . . . There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? I will answer. I designate the case of Cuba.

In particular instances, indeed, the course which the United States would follow has been very distinctly declared, as when Mr. Seward said, in 1865:

It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points: namely, first, that the United States earnestly desires to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. Secondly, that this policy would be brought in imminent jeopardy unless France could deem it consistent with her honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country.

So Secretary Buchanan said, in 1848:

The highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety; and acting upon this principle, we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime State, with all means which Providence has placed at our command.

And Secretary Clayton said, in 1849:

The news of the cession of Cuba to any foreign power would in the United States be the instant signal for war. No foreign power would attempt to take it that did not expect a hostile collision with us as an inevitable consequence.

The Doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection, and that right is recognized by international law. The right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well understood that the exercise

of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the State exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilization of an army by another power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other power may be within its own territory. Yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war. The most common exercise of the right of self-protection outside of a state's own territory and in time of peace is the interposition of objection to the occupation of territory, of points of strategic military or maritime advantage, or to indirect accomplishment of this effect by dynastic arrangement. For example, the objection of England in 1911 to the occupation of a naval station by Germany on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco; the objection of the European Powers generally to the vast force of Russia extending its territory to the Mediterranean; the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Treaty of Berlin; the establishment of buffer states; the objection to the succession of a German prince to the throne of Spain; the many forms of the Eastern Question; the centuries of struggle to preserve the balance of power in Europe—all depend upon the very same principle which underlies the Monroe Doctrine; that is to say, upon the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself. Of course each state must judge for itself when a threatened act will create such a situation. If any state objects to a threatened act and the reasonableness of its objection is not assented to, the efficacy of the objection will depend upon the power behind it.

It is doubtless true that in the adherence of the American people to the original Declaration there was a great element of sentiment and of sympathy for the people of South America who were struggling for freedom, and it has been a source of great satisfaction to the United States that the course which it took in 1823 concurrently with the action of Great Britain played so great a part in assuring the right of self-government to the countries of South America. Yet it is to be observed that in reference to the South-American governments as in all other respects, the international right upon which the Declaration expressly rests is not sentiment or sympathy or a claim to dictate what kind of government any other country shall have, but the safety of the United States.

It is because the new governments cannot be overthrown by the allied Powers "without endangering our peace and happiness"; that "the United States cannot behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

We frequently see statements that the Doctrine has been changed or enlarged; that there is a new or different Doctrine since Monroe's time. They are mistaken. There has been no change. One apparent extension of the statement of Monroe was made by President Polk in his messages of 1845 and 1848, when he included the acquisition of territory by a European Power through cession as dangerous to the safety of the United States. It was really but stating a corollary to the Doctrine of 1823 and asserting the same right of self-protection against the other American states as well as against Europe.

This corollary has been so long and uniformly agreed to by the Government and the people of the United States that it may fairly be regarded as being now a part of the Doctrine.

But, all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, there has been no other change or enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine since it was first promulgated. It must be remembered that not everything said or written by Secretaries of State or even by Presidents constitutes a national policy or can enlarge or modify or diminish a national policy.

It is the substance of the thing to which the nation holds, and that is and always has been that the safety of the United States demands that American territory shall remain American.

The Monroe Doctrine does not assert or imply or involve any right on the part of the United States to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any American state. In the lives of nations, as of individuals, there are many rights unquestioned and universally conceded. The assertion of any particular right must be considered, not as excluding all others, but as coincident with all others which are not inconsistent. The fundamental principle of international law is the principle of independent sovereignty. Upon that all other rules of international law rest. That is the chief and necessary protection of the weak against the power of the strong. Observance of that is the necessary condition to the peace and order of the civilized world. By the declaration of that principle the common judgment of civilization awards to the smallest and weakest state the

liberty to control its own affairs without interference from any other power, however great.

The Monroe Doctrine does not infringe upon that right. It asserts the right. The declaration of Monroe was that the rights and interests of the United States were involved in maintaining a condition, and the condition to be maintained was the independence of all the American countries. It is "the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained" which is declared to render them not subject to future colonization. It is "the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged" that are not to be interfered with. When Mr. Canning's proposals for a joint declaration were under consideration by the Cabinet in the month before the famous message was sent, John Quincy Adams, who played the major part in forming the policy, declared the basis of it in these words:

Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they themselves and no other nation had the right to dispose of their condition. We have no right to dispose of them either alone or in conjunction with other nations. Neither have any other nations the right of disposing of them without their consent.

In the most critical and momentous application of the Doctrine Mr. Seward wrote to the French Minister:

France need not for a moment delay her promised withdrawal of military forces from Mexico and her putting the principle of non-intervention into full and complete practice in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and policy in that respect which on their behalf it has been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened correspondence. The practice of this government from its beginning is a guarantee to all nations of the respect of the American people for the free sovereignty of the people in every other state. We received the instructions from Washington. We applied it sternly in our early intercourse even with France. The same principle and practice have been uniformly inculcated by all our statesmen, interpreted by all our jurists, maintained by all our Congresses, and acquiesced in without practical dissent on all occasions by the American people. It is in reality the chief element of foreign intercourse in our history.

In his message to Congress of December 3, 1906, President Roosevelt said:

In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States toward the other Amer-

ican republics. An idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied or carried with it an assumption of superiority and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that Doctrine applies. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

He quoted the words of the Secretary of State then in office to the recent Pan-American Conference at Rio Janeiro:

We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.

And the President then proceeded to say of these statements:

They have my hearty approval, as I am sure they will have yours, and I cannot be wrong in the conviction that they correctly represent the sentiments of the whole American people. I cannot better characterize the true attitude of the United States in its assertion of the Monroe Doctrine than in the words of the distinguished former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Doctor Drago, ". . . the traditional policy of the United States, without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, condemned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great Powers of Europe."

Curiously enough, many incidents and consequences of that independent condition itself which the United States asserted in the Monroe Doctrine have been regarded in some quarters as infringements upon independence resulting from the Monroe Doctrine. Just as the personal rights of each individual free citizen in the state are limited by the equal rights of every other free individual in the same state, so the sovereign rights of each independent state are limited by the equal sovereign rights of every other independent state. These limitations are not impairments of independent sovereignty. They are the necessary conditions to the existence of independent sovereignty. If the Monroe Doctrine had never been declared or thought of, the sovereign rights of each American republic would have been limited by the equal sovereign rights of every other American republic, including the United States. The United States would have had a right to demand from every other American state observance of treaty obligations and of the

rules of international law. It would have had the right to insist upon due protection for the lives and property of its citizens within the territory of every other American state, and upon the treatment of its citizens in that territory according to the rules of international law. The United States would have had the right as against every other American state to object to acts which the United States might deem injurious to its peace and safety, just as it had the right to object to such acts as against any European Power, and just as all European and American Powers have the right to object to such acts as against one another. All these rights which the United States would have had as against other American states it has now. They are not in the slightest degree affected by the Monroe Doctrine. They exist now just as they would have existed if there had been no Monroe Doctrine. They are neither greater nor less because of that Doctrine. They are not rights of superiority; they are rights of equality. They are the rights which all equal independent states have as against one another. And they cover the whole range of peace and war.

It happens, however, that the United States is very much bigger and more powerful than most of the other American republics. And when a very great and powerful state makes demands upon a very small and weak state it is difficult to avoid a feeling that there is an assumption of superior authority involved in the assertion of superior power, even though the demand be based solely upon the right of equal against equal. An examination of the various controversies which the United States has had with other American Powers will disclose the fact that in every case the rights asserted were rights not of superiority, but of equality. Of course, it cannot be claimed that great and powerful states shall forego their just rights against smaller and less powerful states. The responsibilities of sovereignty attach to the weak as well as to the strong, and a claim to exemption from those responsibilities would imply not equality, but inferiority. The most that can be said concerning a question between a powerful state and a weak one is that the great state ought to be especially considerate and gentle in the assertion and maintenance of its position; ought always to base its acts not upon a superiority of force, but upon reason and law; and ought to assert no rights against a small state because of its weakness which it would not assert

against a great state notwithstanding its power. But in all this the Monroe Doctrine is not concerned at all.

The scope of the Doctrine is strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre-existing American government. It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of either American or European states. In good conduct or bad, observance of rights or violations of them, agreement or controversy, injury or reprisal, coercion or war, the United States finds no warrant in the Monroe Doctrine for interference. So Secretary Cass wrote, in 1858:

With respect to the causes of war between Spain and Mexico the United States have no concern, and do not undertake to judge them. Nor do they claim to interpose in any hostilities which may take place. Their policy of observation and interference is limited to the permanent subjugation of any portion of the territory of Mexico, or of any other American state, to any European power whatever.

So Mr. Seward wrote, in 1861, concerning the allied operations against Mexico:

As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the President does not feel at liberty to question, and does not question, that the sovereigns represented have undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy the war severally or jointly.

So when Germany, Great Britain, and Italy united to compel by naval force a response to their demands on the part of Venezuela, and the German Government advised the United States that it proposed to take coercive measures to enforce its claims for damages and for money against Venezuela, adding, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory," Mr. Hay replied:

That the Government of the United States, although it regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American countries, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated.

Quite independently of the Monroe Doctrine, however, there is a rule of conduct among nations under which each nation is deemed bound to render the good offices of friend-

ship to the others when they are in trouble. The rule has been crystallized in the provisions of The Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Under the head of "The Maintenance of General Peace" in that Convention substantially all the Powers of the world have agreed:

With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between states, the Contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences.

In case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms, the Contracting Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers.

Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance. . . . The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act.

The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the states at variance.

The United States has frequently performed this duty in controversies between American republics among themselves and between American republics and European states. So in the controversy last referred to, the United States used her good offices to bring about a series of arbitrations which superseded the resort of force determined upon by the allied Powers against Venezuela. She did this upon the request of Venezuela. She did it in the performance of no duty and the exercise of no right whatever except the duty and the right of friendship between equal sovereign states. The Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do with acts of this description; yet many times censorious critics, unfamiliar with the facts and uninstructed in the customs and rules of action of the international world, have accused the United States in such cases of playing the rôle of schoolmaster, of assuming the superiority of guardianship, of aiming at a protectorate.

As the Monroe Doctrine neither asserts nor involves any right of control by the United States over any American nation, it imposes upon the United States no duty toward European Powers to exercise such a control. It does not call upon the United States to collect debts or coerce conduct or redress wrongs or revenge injuries. If matters ever come

to a point where in any American country the United States intervenes by force to prevent or end an occupation of territory to the subversion or exclusion of an American government, doubtless new rights and obligations will arise as a result of the acts done in the course of the intervention. Unless such a situation shall have arisen there can be no duty on the part of the United States beyond the exercise of good offices as between equal and independent nations.

There are, indeed, special reasons why the United States should perform that duty of equal friendship to the full limit of international custom and international ethics as declared in The Hague Convention, whenever occasion arises in controversy between American and European Powers. There is a motive for that in the special sympathy and friendship for the gradually developing republics of the South which the American people have always felt since the days of Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Richard Rush and Henry Clay. There is a motive in the strong desire of our Government that no controversy between a European and an American state shall ever come to the point where the United States may be obliged to assert by force the rule of national safety declared by Monroe. And there is a motive in the proper desire of the United States that no friendly nation of Europe or America shall be injured or hindered in the prosecution of its rights in any way or to any extent that can possibly be avoided because that nation respects the rule of safety which Mr. Monroe declared and we maintain. None of these reasons for the exercise of the good offices of equality justifies, nor do all of them together justify, the United States in infringing upon the independence or ignoring the equal rights of the smallest American state.

Nor has the United States ever in any instance during the period of almost a century which has elapsed made the Monroe Doctrine or the motives which lead us to support it the ground or excuse for overstepping the limits which the rights of equal sovereignty set between equal sovereign states.

Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to contribute the weight of her influence toward

a similar end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration would be its own safety, not the safety of the United States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the safety of Chile. Argentina would declare what was necessary for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was necessary for the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself and in its own right, and it would be impossible to go beyond that except by more or less offensive and defensive alliances. Of course, such alliances are not to be considered.

It is plain that the building of the Panama Canal greatly accentuates the practical necessity of the Monroe Doctrine as it applies to all the territory surrounding the Caribbean or near the Bay of Panama. The plainest lessons of history and the universal judgment of all responsible students of the subject concur in teaching that the potential command of the route to and from the Canal must rest with the United States, and that the vital interests of the nation forbid that such command shall pass into other hands. Certainly no nation which has acquiesced in the British occupation of Egypt will dispute this proposition. Undoubtedly, as one passes to the south and the distance from the Caribbean increases, the necessity of maintaining the rule of Monroe becomes less immediate and apparent. But who is competent to draw the line? Who will say, "To this point the rule of Monroe should apply; beyond this point, it should not"? Who will say that a new national force created beyond any line that he can draw will stay beyond it and will not in the long course of time extend itself indefinitely?

The danger to be apprehended from the immediate proximity of hostile forces was not the sole consideration leading to the Declaration. The need to separate the influences determining the development and relation of states in the New World from the influences operating in Europe played an even greater part. The familiar paragraphs of Washington's Farewell Address upon this subject were not rhetoric. They were intensely practical rules of conduct for the future guidance of the country.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and col-

lisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

It was the same instinct which led Jefferson, in the letter to Monroe already quoted, to say :

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs.

The concurrence of Washington and Hamilton and Jefferson in the declaration of this principle of action entitles it to great respect. They recalled the long period during which every war waged in Europe between European Powers and arising from European causes of quarrel was waged also in the New World. English and French and Spanish and Dutch killed and harried one another in America, not because of quarrels between the settlers in America, but because of quarrels between the European Powers having dominion over them. Separation of influences as absolute and complete as possible was the remedy which the wisest of Americans agreed upon. It was one of the primary purposes of Monroe's Declaration to insist upon this separation, and to accomplish it he drew the line at the water's edge. The problem of national protection in the distant future is one not to be solved by the first impressions of the casual observer, but only by profound study of the forces which, in the long life of nations, work out results. In this case the results of such a study by the best men of the formative period of the United States are supported by the instincts of the American democracy holding steadily in one direction for almost a century. The problem has not changed essentially. If the Declaration of Monroe was right when the message was sent, it is right now. South America is no more distant to-day than it was then. The tremendous armaments and international jealousies of Europe afford little assurance to those who think we may now abandon the separatist policy of Washington. That South-American states have become too strong for colonization or occupation is cause for satisfaction. That Europe has no purpose or wish to colonize American territory is most gratifying. These facts may make it improbable that it will be necessary to apply the Monroe Doctrine in the southern parts of South America; but they furnish no reason whatever for retracting or denying or abandoning a decla-

ration of public policy, just and reasonable when it was made, and which, if occasion for its application shall arise in the future, will still be just and reasonable.

A false conception of what the Monroe Doctrine is, of what it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its limits, has invaded the public press and affected public opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes of national expansion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Interested motives to compel Central or South American countries to do or refrain from doing something by which individual Americans may profit invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Clamors for national glory from minds too shallow to grasp at the same time a sense of national duty invoke the Monroe Doctrine. The intolerance which demands that control over the conduct and the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyranny invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Thoughtless people who see no difference between lawful right and physical power assume that the Monroe Doctrine is a warrant for interference in the internal affairs of all weaker nations in the New World. Against this supposititious doctrine many protests both in the United States and in South America have been made, and justly made. To the real Monroe Doctrine these protests have no application.

ELIHU ROOT.